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Abstract: This  paper  examines  first,  how  founder  CEOs  affect  firm  performance  and 
second,  whether  government  ownership  moderates  the  relationship  between  founder 
CEOs and firm performance of companies listed in Malaysia between 2002 and 2011. 
Firms  led  by  founder  CEOs  perform  better  than  those  led  by  non-founder  CEOs. 
Although a direct-effect test indicates that government ownership may be detrimental to 
firm performance, there exists a positive relationship between founder CEOs and firm 
performance  in  the  presence  of  government  ownership  from  the  perspective  of  growth 
opportunities. In terms of profitability, however, government ownership may not increase 
return on assets. These findings suggest that the government may play a crucial role to
protect investor’s wealth, especially with respect to long-term survival of a company.
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1. Introduction 
 
Since 1950s, studies that focused on determinants of firm performance have 
suggested the following contribute to firm performance: (a) industry 
structure (Karabag & Berggren, 2014); (b) corporate governance including 
ownership structure (Andreou, Louca, & Panayides, 2014; Oluwatayo & 
Amole, 2013); and (c) economic conditions (Pantea, Gligor & Anis 2014). 
Earlier studies have also examined the relationship between firms led by 
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founder CEOs and their performance in particular, (Anderson, Duru & Reeb, 
2009; Chen, Gray & Nowland, 2012; Isakov & Weisskopf, 2014; Willard, 
Krueger & Feeser, 1992). They found founder CEOs can be either value-
enhancing or value-diminishing for the company. 
Chen et al. (2012) argued that founder management has pros and cons to 
shareholders. Among its advantages are: potential for shareholder’s long 
term wealth creation as founder CEO dedicates himself or herself to 
achieving the best performance for the company and ensure its long term 
survival. Fama and Jensen (1983) explain that founders will utilise their 
experiences and skills to ensure the success of firms. Furthermore, they are 
more likely to be influential in executing decisions (R. B. Adams et al., 
2005). Founder management is also able to solve problems related to 
principal-agent more effectively. By ensuring high levels of monitoring and 
oversight (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  
The disadvantage of founder management is the risk of private benefits 
to the CEO in terms of siphoning of wealth to the detriment of shareholders. 
Anderson and Reeb (2003) emphasise that founders will ensure they gain 
private benefits (e.g. higher compensation or remuneration, attractive 
dividend payments, lower risk and etc) rather than focusing on the firm’s 
long term achievement. Anderson et al. (2009) conclude that founder 
management seeks private advantages to the shareholders’ detriment. In 
short, founders may either bring about greater benefit to the company via 
enhanced monitoring or disadvantages via private gains (Isakov & 
Weisskopf, 2014). 
 Therefore, this study provides empirical evidence as to how founder 
CEOs can improve firm performance by adding a variable, government 
ownership. Many companies face problems as a result of separation of 
ownership and control (Yu, 2013). Difference in ownership produces 
different impact on firm performance. On one hand, government-owned 
firms are expected to act differently relative to their private counterparts 
(Pedersen & Thomsen, 2003). On the other hand, government ownership 
may mean a poor governance structure because a public portfolio allows 
other shareholders to free ride on the monitoring of management provided 
by the government (Putterman, 1993). Economists believe that government 
ownership is usually detrimental to firm performance (Tian & Estrin, 2008).  
The role of government in contributing to firm performance is a popular 
research topic (Ng, Yuce & Chen, 2009; Wolf, 2009; Yu, 2013). In Malaysia, 
government linked companies (GLCs) play an important role in its economic 
development. However, GLCs in Malaysia are perceived to be less efficient 
and profitable. Numerous researches have been undertaken to study how 
government ownership enhances firm performance in Malaysia (Johnson & 
Mitton, 2003; Lau, 2013; Lau & Tong, 2008; Razak, Ahmad & Joher, 2011). 
The empirical significance of these studies with regard to the moderating role 
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of government ownership on the relation between founder management and 
firm performance has not been established. This study attempts to provide 
some preliminary conclusions on this issue. 
The study will focus on the relationship between founder CEOs and firm 
performance among companies listed in Malaysia. It also attempts to identify 
whether government ownership plays a significant role in moderating the 
relationship between founder CEOs and firm performance. This paper makes 
several contributions. First, this study documents the role of founder CEOs 
on the performance of Malaysian public listed firms. Second, government 
ownership is used as a moderator to test the association between founder 
CEOs and firm performance. Third, two measures of firm performance, 
namely return on assets (ROA) and growth opportunities, are used. While 
the former represents profitability, the latter reflects firm performance from 
a wider perspective. Overall, the findings highlight the impacts of founder 
CEOs and government ownership, both separately and jointly.  
This paper is organised as follows. Part Two contains review of main 
literature on this topic while Part Three consists of data and methodology. 
Part Four discusses findings and results of the study and the final part 
concludes the paper. 
 
 
2.     Literature Review 
 
2.1    Founder management and firm performance 
 
Extant empirical studies show no specific pattern on the effect of founder 
management on firm performance. Gagné and Deci (2005) define roles as a 
typical behaviour that characterises a person in a specific social context, 
specifically leaders. The CEO’s role as founder of the firm (relations-
oriented role) would shape his or her opinions in relation to firm decisions. 
Fama and Jensen (1983) suggest that when ownership and control rest with 
the same individual, it will reduce the monitoring cost by external 
shareholders, thus enhancing firm value. McConaughy, Walker, Henderson, 
& Mishra (1998) indicate that founding family-controlled firms are more 
efficient as the founder focuses on long term wealth creation for shareholders 
and firms. Fischer and Pollock (2004) also assert that founder involvement 
in the firm ensures the CEO is committed to the success of the firm. 
According to Anderson and Reeb (2003) who studied firms in US, 
founders are associated with greater firm values suggesting that they bring 
unique, value-adding skills to the firm that result in superior accounting 
performance and market valuations. Similarly in China, Xia (2008) finds that 
investors are better protected if the firm is managed by founder CEO. The 
finding is consistent with that of Anderson and Reeb (2003) who agree there 
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is a positive relation between founder management and accounting 
profitability measures. In Taiwan, Chen et al. (2012) focus on multi-founder 
firms and define multiple founder firms as those “that were founded by 
multiple individuals with no family connections but actively involved in the 
firms as directors.” The result shows that founder-managed firms are valued 
greatly. In Switzerland, Isakov and Weisskopf (2014) found that companies 
with active founders as leaders have higher profitability. They argue that 
company founders with their superior skills and incentives will enhance the 
firm’s profitability 
On the other hand, Singell and Thornton (1997) argue that family 
managed firms with founders as CEO are less profitable. This is supported 
by Gomez-Mejia, Larraza-Kintana & Makri (2003) who also agree that 
founder CEOs are potentially less accountable to shareholders. The 
entrenchment hypothesis suggests corporate opacity allows these controlling 
shareholders to accrue private benefits of control (Anderson et al., 2009). 
Consistently, In Norway, Randøy and Goel (2003) find that large 
shareholders’ ownership is significantly negative to firm value in founder-
led SME firms. Anderson et al. (2009) find that founder firms exhibit a 
negative relation to firm performance as founder management in a firm seeks 
for private benefits at the cost of other shareholders for 2,000 largest 
industrial firms in the US. Jameson, Prevost & Puthenpurackal (2014) 
examine founders who are actively managing their firms and their findings 
indicate that founders on boards may expropriate the minority shareholders’ 
interests.  
Findings of studies on how founders affect firm performance are mixed 
and no consistent pattern can be found. In other words, there is no clear 
prediction about the overall effect of founder management on the 
performance of firm. Therefore, we develop the following hypothesis in a 
non-directional alternate form: 
Hypothesis 1: Founder management is significantly related to firm 
performance. 
 
2.2    Government Ownership and Performance 
 
Besides founder management, prior studies have also shown that government 
ownership determines firm performance. Some studies like Dewenter and 
Malatesta (2001) document a negative association between government 
ownership and firm performance because governments may not be oriented 
towards maximising profit. Besides, there are more government bureaucracy 
and thus, bigger agency problems (Sun & Tong, 2003). Similarly, Tian and 
Estrin (2008) suggest that government shareholding (with a small voting 
right) does not allow it to monitor and control the manager, and which leads 
to reduction in firm performance. Zeitun and Tian (2007) suggest a reduction 
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government ownership in order to increase firm performance. Ng et al. 
(2009) support the negative relationship between government ownership and 
its performance and conclude that privatisation is beneficial to firm 
performance. Mykhayliv and Zauner (2013) point out the negative effect of 
government ownership on firm performance. Ting and Lean (2015) also 
concur on the negative relationship between government ownership and firm 
performance. 
Conversely, several studies point to a positive relationship. Yu (2013) 
finds that government ownership is positively related to performance of 
China listed companies after 2006 because government provides both 
financing and resource-related support. In Singapore, Ang and Ding (2006) 
conclude that GLCs have greater valuations than their counterparts in 
Singapore. They explain that Singaporean GLCs have better governance 
mechanisms and stronger monitoring, in addition to being leaner 
organizations. Kang and Kim (2012) find that firms from marketised state-
owned enterprises perform well in China.  
In view of the contradicting associations between government ownership 
and firm performance, this paper investigate the potential moderating effect 
of government ownership in the Malaysian context. The hypothesis is thus 
as follows: 
Hypothesis 2: Government ownership moderates the relationship 
between founder management and firm performance. 
 
 
3.     Data and Methodology 
 
The study has the following criteria for sample selection. First, it excludes 
financial services companies due to their different regulatory mechanism. 
Each firm must have the required 12-year data from 2002 to 2013. Balanced 
panel data is used in order to maintain the fairness of observations and 
dynamics could be monitored closely. Additionally, the firm has full 
information of CEO profile, especially on founder information. Government 
ownership information is available in the 30 largest shareholders’ list of the 
company. After screening through the samples, the collected dataset consists 
of 183 public listed firms between 2002 and 2013.  
 
3.1    Variables and Measurement 
 
This section explains regression-related variables. For dependent variables, 
ROA, a widely used measure of firm performance, is calculated as net 
income divided by total assets (Anderson & Reeb, 2003; McConnell & 
Servaes, 1990). As for growth opportunities (GROWTH), following 
McConnell and Servaes (1990) and Weir, Laing & McKnight (2002), it is 
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computed as subtraction of prior-year sales from current-year sales divided 
by the prior-year sales. In terms of independent variable, the study follows 
Adams, Almeida & Ferreira, (2009) with dummy variable to measure 
founder management. We set FOUNDER_CEO as 1 if the CEO of the firm 
is also a founder, otherwise, 0. For moderating variable, this study measures 
government ownership (GVO) as the percentage of shares held by the 
government. With respect to control variables, this study uses firm size, debt 
ratio and tangibility. The natural logarithm of total assets is used to represent 
firm size (SIZE) (Ang & Ding, 2006; Deesomsak, Paudyal & Pescetto, 2004; 
Rajan & Zingales, 1995; Sogorb-Mira, 2005). The debt ratio (DEBT) is the 
ratio of total debt to total assets (Ting & Lean, 2011). The tangibility 
(TANG) is computed as the ratio of fixed assets to total assets (Zeitun & 
Tian, 2007). 
 
3.2    Research model 
 
In order to examine the impact of founder management on firm performance, 
the study proposes Model 1 as follows.  
 
it 0 1 it 2 it 3 it 4 it 5 it it
PERF =β +β Founder_CEO +β GVO +β SIZE +β DEBT +β TANG +ε  
(Model 1) 
 
In where subscripts i and t represent firm (cross-section) and time (time-
series) respectively. PERFit = Performance (ROA or GROWTH) for firm i 
in year t; FOUNDER_CEOit =1 if the CEO of the firm is also a founder, 0 
otherwise for firm i in year t; GVOit = Percentage of government ownership 
for firm i in year t; SIZEit = The natural logarithm of total assets for firm i in 
year t; DEBTit = Total debt divided by total assets; TANGit = Fixed assets 
divided by total assets. 
To test government ownership as the moderator on the association 
between FOUNDER_CEO and PERF, this study uses it as an additional 
variable in Model 2. 
 
0 1 2 3it it it
4 5 6it it it it
PERF =β +β Founder_CEO +β GVO +β Founder_CEO*GVO+
β SIZE +β DEBT +β TANG +ε
 
   (Model 2) 
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4.     Findings and Analysis 
 
4.1    Univariate Analysis 
 
Table 1 presents the statistical description of the sample. The average ROA 
and TBQ is 4.62 per cent and 98.72 percent, respectively. The sample 
companies derive approximately 4.6 percent of profits using their total 
assets, as shown by the average ROA. The mean GROWTH value of 0.0070 
suggests that the sample firms have low growth opportunities. 
Approximately, 31.04 per cent of the sample firms went public with a 
founder CEO at the helm. The statistics also indicate that government 
ownership of Malaysian listed companies averages at about 42.93 percent. 
Furthermore, the firm size of 12.2494 shows that the average total assets of 
the study’s sample firms total RM1.774 trillion (the average logged value is 
12.249). The average ratio of total debt to total assets for the observed period 
is about 31.05 per cent. The tangibility of 0.5176 shows that 51.76 percent 
of the total assets is fixed assets. 
 
Table 1: Descriptive analysis 
Variables Mean S.D. 
ROA 0.0462 0.1201 
GROWTH 0.0070 0.1381 
FOUNDER_CEO 0.3104 0.4628 
GVO 0.4293 0.2829 
SIZE 12.2494 1.5271 
DEBT 0.3105 0.3284 
TANG 0.5176 0.3344 
 
Figure 1: ROAs of founder and non-founder firms, 2002-2013
 
 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Founder 0.065 0.050 0.050 0.050 0.059 0.065 0.063 0.059 0.076 0.061
Non-founder 0.012 0.039 0.019 0.033 0.039 0.064 0.048 0.050 0.050 0.045
0.000
0.010
0.020
0.030
0.040
0.050
0.060
0.070
0.080
R
O
A
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Figure 1 indicates ROA of the founder and non-founder firms between 2002 
and 2013. It shows that firms with founder-CEO outperform the rest. This 
result is consistent with those of previous studies (Gao & Jain, 2012; He, 
2008; McConaughy et al., 1998; Randøy & Goel, 2003). The univariate 
comparison of ROA between founder-CEO’s firms and non-founder-CEO’s 
firms in Figure 1 confirms that founder management enhances firm 
performance. This could be explained as the increment of monitoring as a 
founder CEO provides a better alignment of interests between owner and 
manager (Isakov & Weisskopf, 2014). 
 
4.2    Correlation analysis 
 
To ensure there is no multicollinearity among variables, Pearson correlation 
analysis is conducted and shown in Table 2. The highest absolute value found 
is of -0.6018, indicating no likelihood of multicollinearity problem. Besides, 
there are significant correlations between ROA, GROWTH and explanatory 
variables. Moreover, the value of VIF are all less than 2 (O’brien, 2007) (VIF 
for FOUNDER_CEO = 1.0666, VIF for GVO = 1.1402, VIF for SIZE = 
1.0779, VIF for 1.6535 = 1.15 and VIF for TANG = 1.5833 respectively), 
suggesting again no multicollinearity problem among the variables. With 
that, no variables should be left out from the multivariate analysis (O’brien, 
2007). 
 
Table 2: Correlation Analysis 
  
ROA TBQ 
FOUNDER 
_CEO 
GVO SIZE DEBT 
ROA  1.0000 
     
GROWTH  -0.1810*** 1.0000 
    
FOUNDER 
_CEO  
0.0748*** 0.0876*** 1.0000 
   
GVO  -0.0815***  -0.2194*** -0.0642*** 1.0000 
  
SIZE  0.3035*** -0.5075*** -0.0103 0.1292*** 1.0000 
 
DEBT  -0.1677*** -0.0126 0.0365 0.1679*** 0.0326 1.0000 
TANG 0.2645*** -0.0313 0.0146 -0.1340*** -0.0191 -0.6018 
Note: * and *** denote the coefficients are significant at the 1 and 10 per cent levels, 
respectively. 
 
4.3     Regression analysis 
 
4.3.1   Main effect 
 
To ensure the most appropriate model for panel data estimation, the 
Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test (Breusch & Pagan, 1980) was conducted. The 
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LM statistic (P > 0.10) suggests that pooled ordinary least square (OLS) 
regression could provide better estimations than panel data regression. 
Hence, pooled OLS regression is employed to test the constructed models. 
Potential heteroscedasticity problem was diagnosed using the White (1980) 
test. Since the diagnostic check indicates heteroskedasticity problems, the 
problem is rectified using OLS with heteroskedasticity robust standard error 
(Hoechle, 2007). 
Table 3 shows the pooled OLS regression results of using ROA as 
dependent variable. The F-statistic points to the model’s overall significance. 
Based on the finding, founder CEO is found to have significantly positive 
impact on ROA. This finding is in line with Saito (2008), Xia (2008) and 
Isakov and Weisskopf (2014) that founder management enhances firm value. 
The CEOs who are also the founders do care about their companies as they 
their wealth is largely derived from it (Arregle, Hitt, Sirmon & Very, 2007). 
Isakov and Weisskopf (2014) argue that founders may be able to exploit 
more investment opportunities to increase their firm performance. They 
would try to ensure longevity and growth which are consistent with the 
objectives of an owned business. 
 
Table 3. Regression Analysis – Main Effect 
Variable DV = ROA DV = GROWTH 
Intercept - 0.3110 
(- 5.1483) 
*** 
- 0.3122 
(- 5.1796)*** 
0.6113 
(11.1832)*** 
0.6095 
(10.9052)*** 
Testing variable     
FOUNDER_ 
CEO 
0.0195 
(4.0262)*** 
0.0196 
(3.9453)*** 
0.0188 
(2.8905)** 
0.0199 
(3.0488)** 
GVO - 0.0376 
(- 4.1932)*** 
 - 0.0792 
(- 7.8353)*** 
 
DUMGVO  - 0.0199 
(- 3.4507)*** 
 - 0.0263 
(- 4.5466)*** 
Control variable     
SIZE 0.0253 
(9.0134)*** 
0.0251 
(9.2303)*** 
-0.0460 
(- 11.6294)*** 
- 0.0471 
(- 11.7415)*** 
DEBT - 0.0030 
(- 0.0763) 
- 0.0024 
(- 0.0594) 
- 0.0075 
(- 0.6690) 
- 0.0098 
(- 0.8403) 
TANG 0.0884 
(2.0252)* 
0.0889 
(2.0353)* 
-0.0298 
(-3.2211)** 
-0.0284 
(-2.9291)** 
Year fixed 
effect 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed 
effect 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjust R2 0.1810 0.1801 0.2960 0.2806 
F-statistic 21.2091*** 21.0855*** 39.4545*** 36.6766*** 
Notes: t-statistics are given in parentheses. ***, ** and * denotes the significance 
level at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.  
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Model 1 shows a significantly negative association between GVO and ROA, 
indicating that firms that has government interventions are less profitable 
because of their poor investment decisions (Ting & Lean, 2015). More 
importantly, as shown in Table 3, the results remain when using DUMGVO 
as an alternative proxy of government ownership. This implies that firms 
with government ownership has poorer governance mechanisms that weaken 
their performance. 
This study performs another robustness check by replacing ROA with 
GROWTH as a measure of firm performance. This study re-estimates Model 
1 with pooled OLS regression and the results remain qualitatively the same. 
The findings reconfirm that firms (i) who have their founders in the active 
management are more profitable, (ii) with government intervention are 
detrimental as its reduce their performance. 
The coefficients of SIZE and TANG are significantly positive when ROA 
is used as the dependent variable, in line with Ang and Ding (2006). 
However, SIZE and TANG are found to be significantly and negatively 
associated with GROWTH. Moreover, the insignificant effects of DEBT on 
firm performance show that DEBT does not directly affect firm performance. 
 
4.3.2   Moderating effect 
 
Based on Model 2, the moderating effect of GVO (FOUNDER_CEO*GVO) 
on the association between founder management and firm performance, 
particularly GROWTH is proven to be significantly positive at 1 per cent 
level. This finding suggests that government ownership strengthens the 
positive association between founder management and firm performance. 
Put differently, a large government ownership of a firm will increase the 
positive effect of founder management on GROWTH. To check for 
robustness, this study tests the interaction effects between founder 
management and government by replacing government ownership with its 
dummy variable, giving us FOUNDER_CEO*DUMGVO in Model 2. The 
moderating effect of government ownership on the association between 
founder management and GROWTH is proven to be significantly positive at 
10 per cent level. This implies that government ownership plays a crucial 
role to protect investor wealth, especially with respect to the long-term 
survival of a company. 
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Table 4: Moderating Effect 
Dependent 
variable: 
ROA GROWTH 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Intercept - 0.3109 
(- 5.1393) *** 
- 0.3123 
(- 5.1789)*** 
0.6159 
(11.3769)*** 
 0.6105 
(11.0408)*** 
     
Testing variables     
FOUNDER_CEO 0.0183 
(2.4589)* 
0.0210 
(2.8942)** 
- 0.0156 
 (- 1.2598) 
 0.0049 
(0.4690)  
GVO 0.0383 
(- 3.5994)*** 
 - 0.0993 
(- 8.56881)*** 
 
DUMGVO  0.0191 
(2.67726)** 
 - 0.0347 
(- 4.9413)*** 
FOUNDER_CEO 
* GVO 
0.0029 
(0.1684) 
 0.0841 
(3.5030)*** 
 
FOUNDER_CEO 
* DUMGVO 
 0.0026 
(- 0.2816) 
 0.0268 
(2.0795)* 
     
Control variables     
SIZE 0.0253 
(8.9955)*** 
0.0251  
(9.2216)*** 
-0.0457  
(-11.6468)*** 
-0.0467 
(-11.7058)*** 
DEBT -0.0031 
 (-0.0781) 
-0.0023  
(-0.0572) 
-0.0100  
(-0.9199) 
-0.0107 
(-0.9368) 
TANG 0.0885 
(2.0267)* 
0.0888 
(2.0350)* 
-0.0284 
(-3.0817)** 
-0.0276 
(-2.8590)** 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed 
effect 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Adjusted R2 0.1805 0.1797 0.3009 0.2822 
Notes: ***, ** and * denotes the significance level at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 
4.3.3   Robustness Check- Two-stage least squares (2SLS) 
 
This study adopts two-stage least squares (2SLS) to address potential 
endogeneity issues. FOUNDER_CEO, which is used as the main proxy for 
founder management, is the dependent variable. The 2SLS results shown in 
Table 5 corroborate with those of the pooled OLS regression. Therefore, the 
pooled OLS method provides reliable estimates. 
 
Table 5: Regression results of ultimate owners’ control, family control and 
leverage – 2SLS 
Stage Stage 1 Stage 2 
Dependent Variable FOUNDER_CEO ROA GROWTH 
Model Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Intercept 0.0354 
           (070757) 
-0.3016  
(-5.0209)*** 
0.6204  
(11.4003)*** 
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Table 5: (Continued) 
Testing variables    
FOUNDER_CEO  0.0196 
(4.0308)*** 
0.0188  
(2.8857)** 
GVO -0.5304 
(-2.6599)** 
-0.0396 
(-4.4237)*** 
-0.0812 
(-8.0317)*** 
    
Control variables    
SIZE -0.0486 
(-1.3919) 
0.0251 
(8.9849)*** 
-0.0462 
(-11.6915)*** 
DEBT 0.3584  
(2.2218)* 
-0.0017 
(-0.0429) 
-0.0063 
(-0.5566) 
TANG  0.0884 
(2.0242)* 
-0.0299 
(-3.2262)** 
Year fixed effect    Yes  Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effect    Yes  Yes Yes 
    
Adjusted R2  0.1810 0.2960 
 Note: t-statistics are given in parentheses. ***, ** and * denotes the significance level at 
1%, 5% and 10%, respectively 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
This paper examines how founder CEOs affect performance of publicly-
listed companies in Malaysia. The results show that firms led by founder 
CEOs performed better those led by non-founder CEOs. This positive 
association between founder management and firm performance is consistent 
with the findings of Chen et al. (2012), confirming that founder involvement 
in firms could result in more wealth creation for shareholders. Moreover, the 
result also indicates that government ownership plays an important role in 
strengthening the positive relationship between founder CEOs and growth 
opportunities. However, investors believe that government may not serve as 
an effective control mechanism to mitigate the risk that founders may 
prioritise their personal interest. Hence, firms led by founder CEOs are more 
profitable with higher government ownership from the perspective of growth 
opportunities. 
This paper contributes to the literature on firms led by founder CEOs as 
well as to policy makers. In particular, the positive effect of founder CEOs 
on firm performance suggests that performance of firms is driven primarily 
by CEO founders with the helping hand of government. Although 
government intervention may be not welcomed by companies, when 
interacting with founder management, government ownership actually 
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results in increased benefits. Future studies can explore the effect of different 
generations of founders in firms to compare their effect on firm performance.  
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